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UNWRITTEN LAW:
THE NTH AMENDMENT AND COMMUNAL RIGHTS
by Sara Nichols
Introduction
Despite its recent surge of popularity among a par-
ticular group of legal scholars and constitutional jurists, a
mention of the Ninth Amendment even to lawyers usually
draws a blank. "That's the really obscure one, isn't it?", "Is
that about states' rights or something?" and "How does that
go again?" are among the more frequent responses given.
The answers to these questions are: (1) "Yes;" (2) "No.
That's the Tenth;" and
(3) "The enumeration in the Constitution
of certain rights shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."
In the rare event that people actually listen to the third
answer, a strange reaction occurs. People are intrigued by
the idea of unenumerated rights. Lawyers wonder why they
haven't heard much about this amendment before. What
does it mean? How has it been interpreted? Ever since
Justice Goldberg explicitly invoked the Ninth Amendment
to include the right of privacy in his 1965 concurring opi-
nion to Griswold v. Connecticut,I comparatively much has
been written and discussed about the formerly obscure
amendment. For many lawyers and jurists, the Ninth
Amendment is now synonymous with the right to privacy
and little else. Others believe that the amendment was
never intended to limit government power in any way, thus
it is inappropriate to invoke the amendment at all. Although
it has rarely been explicitly considered apart from the
"penumbra of privacy"2 created by the Bill of Rights, the
controversy surrounding the right to marital privacy as
developed in the Griswold case and its progeny adheres
to the Ninth Amendment. Because the Roe v. Wade3 deci-
sion supports a woman's right to abortion based largely
upon her and her doctor's right to privacy, the Ninth
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Amendment has come to be associated with the right to
abortion as well. Because of its link with the controversial
right to abortion, the interpretation of this amendment has
become a litmus test for conservatives and liberals alike
and has been the source of much debate in the recent con-
firmations hearings for Supreme Court nominees Robert
Bork and Anthony Kennedy. Judge Bork and his
compatriots4 read the amendment narrowly as neither an
expansion nor a contraction of federal power, merely a
redundant statement. Like the Tenth, "a meaningless
truism." Kennedy too reads the amendment narrowly.
Conservative critics, as we shall see, disagree strongly with
any implication that the amendment was intended to app-
ly as a limit on governmental and in particular state power.
Until now, property and liberty have been inextricably
linked in our legal system. Rights are based on and con-
ceived of as the property of individuals. For those of us
who would like to redefine rights as communal and sever
liberty from property, the due process clause presents a
dilemma - it explicitly links the two. The Ninth Amend-
ment, in its simple affirmation of the people as the ultimate
source of liberty, may be better equipped to further our new
conception of rights than is the due process clause. The
Ninth Amendment may represent the gap between the
United States Constitution and the unwritten law of the
people. The questions presented by this paper are: how
do we close that gap? How do we determine the law of
the people? How do we use the federal Constitution and
Courts to enhance our rights without infringing on local
and community control?
For clarification's sake, I also feel the need to state
what this paper is not attempting to accomplish. This paper
is not intended to be a close, thorough report of Ninth
Amendment case law since Griswold v. Connecticut.5 That
goal has been accomplished sufficiently by other legal
scholars, upon whom I will rely. Nor is this paper intended
to be a re-investigation of the true subjective intent of the
framers. In 1955, Bennett Patterson valiantly attempted
to do this in The Forgotten Ninth Amendment.6 Others
have quarreled with his interpretation.' Certainly, in order
to wield it adequately, we must be aware of the history of
the amendment and examine it in context. Nonetheless,





It is difficult to forge blithely ahead presenting the
history of the Ninth Amendment without being aware that
every choice we make in telling this story will skew the way
in which we view the amendment today. There is particular
scholarly concern focused on the intent behind the Ninth
Amendment now because of its recent surge of popularity
primarily in the line of privacy cases but also in other con-
stitutional contexts. Unquestionably, most of the first eight
amendments to the Constitution have had their applica-
tion and scope expanded over the years of interpretation
by the Supreme Court. But the Ninth was not explicitly
used for the first century and a half of its existence.
8
Moreover, as is clear by its wording, the Ninth provides
no explicit limitation on federal powers. It is for these
reasons that the intent behind the Ninth Amendment is
as important and controversial as it is today. Many better
qualified historians than I have ploughed painstakingly
through the First Annals of Congress and James Madison's
correspondence in search of the amendment's "true mean-
ing."9 Except for R.H. Clark, most improve little on the
amendment's history as exhumed by Bennett Patterson in
1955.
Patterson's The Forgotten Ninth Amendment appears
to be the first serious treatment of the Ninth Amendment
since its inclusion in the Bill of Rights.' 0 The greatest con-
tribution of Patterson's work is that it provides a legislative
history of the amendment, invaluable in constucting a
vision of what it can mean today. Patterson sees great
liberatory power in the amendment, although he would
restrict its protection to individuals and individuals only,
perhaps the biggest limitation of his work.
Most of the debate about the Bill of Rights at the time
of making of the Constitution was not about the content
of the bill, but about whether to include it at all. The
federalists, lead by James Madison, conceived of a govern-
ment of limited enumerated powers as sufficient without
specifying the rights of men. Since rights and power were
conceived of as inhering in the people and the sovereign
people willingly gave up some of their power to form a
republic, it was thought that those rights were implicit in
the very existence of the Constitution. But Jefferson and
the other Virginian anti-federalists feared the centralized
power that was being created and wanted to ensure that
the newly-formed federal government would not tread upon
their liberties and rights. They sought an assurance that
the federal government would not go beyond its delegated
authority. Because he believed that rights were natural,
inhered in the people, and were therefore implicit in the
Constitution, Madison argued that the inclusion of a Bill
of Rights was worse than redundant - it was potentially
dangerous. A specific recital of liberties upon which the
federal government could not intrude would strongly
imply that, but for the enumeration of rights, the govern-
ment could have, for example, abridged or denied the
freedom of speech. By extension, any right which was not
enumerated in the document, for whatever reason, could
be intruded upon, even if the power to do so was not ex-
plicitly given up by the people." As a compromise measure,
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were drafted. In final
form, they read:
Ninth. The enumeration in the Constitution
of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.
Tenth. Powers not expressly delegated in this
document are retained by the states,
respectively and the people.
Originally, the Bill of Rights was to be incorporated
into the body of the Constitution rather than tacked onto
the end. At one point, there was a specific plan for integra-
tion of each of the amendments. The Ninth Amendment
was to be inserted under Article I, Section 9, between the
provisions relating to a "Bill of Attainder" and the clause
with respect to a "capitation or other direct tax" and would
read:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Con-
stitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall
not be so construed as to diminish the just im-
portance of other rights retained by the people,
or to enlarge the powers delegated by the Con-
stitution; but either as actual limitations of such
powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution. 
1 2
Patterson places great emphasis on the phrase "here or
elsewhere," omitted in the later and final version of the
amendment. He reads that phrase as dispositive of the
framers' intention to apply the principle embodied in the
Ninth Amendment to the entire Constitution. But the
amendment on its own terms seems clear in that regard.
What is less clear is whether the amendment was in-
tended to represent a limitation on state as well as federal
government. Patterson painstakingly examines the various
drafts of the Bill of Rights and the debate surrounding its
exact wording and emerges with a concept of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments as distinct from the first eight. He
reads these two amendments as affirmative declarations
of human liberty, rather than limitations on the powers of
government like the other eight. The courts too have
recognized a distinction between the first eight and the latter
two amendments. In Eilenbecker v. the District Court of
Plymouth County, Iowa,13 the Court held that only the first
eight amendments to the Constitution were intended to be
narrowly construed as limitations on the federal govern-
ment. On their own terms, the first eight are indeed limita-
tions on the powers of government: "Congress shall make
no law. .. ", "the right of the people to be secure.., shall
38 IN THE PUBUC INTEREST
I
not," etc.
Unfortunately, not only is it difficult to read the Ninth
and Tenth exclusively as limitations on federal power, but
many jurists have found it impossible to view one or the
other as a limitation on the power of government at all.
Rather they are viewed variously as declarations of prin-
ciples which are fundamental to the formation of our system
and redundant. Patterson's vision of the two amendments
as mutually reinforcing declarations of human rights which
may be invoked as limitations on any government, is
distinctly in the minority. Lately the two amendments have
become set in opposition to each other. Ironically perhaps,
right-wing groups and members of the Court have embrac-
ed the Tenth Amendment as declarative of state sovereign-
ty and affirmatively limiting federal power to regulate
states,'4 while rejecting the expansive vision of the Ninth
Amendment offered by the Griswold case. But many con-
servative jurists do not see their interpretation as conflicted
at all. They see the Ninth Amendment as limited by the
Tenth. Recently appointed Supreme Court Justice Anthony
Kennedy, for example, believes that to enforce unenumer-
ated rights against the states would be to expand federal
power. That power, he argues, may not be expanded
because of the limitation in the Tenth Amendment.'
5
Supreme Court reject Robert Bork maintains that to ex-
pand our notion of some rights, for instance to create
"welfare rights," would necessarily diminish other rights and
therefore expand federal power.' 6 Conservative jurists,
Berger and Caplan raise the same objections and further
assert that the Ninth Amendment was intended to refer
to only those rights already enumerated elsewhere, par-
ticularly in states constitutions of the time." Thus, con-
ceptually, the amendment could not be expanded to include
"new" rights not contemplated in the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury. Furthermore, because these rights are part of state
rather than federal law, legal defenses asserting them do
not "arise" under federal law and therefore federal courts
have no jurisdiction to hear these claims.' 8
Judicial History
Patterson also traces the scant judicial interpretation
of the Ninth Amendment. As of 1955, the Ninth had not
been used as an affirmative limit on federal power. But the
principle embodied in the Ninth Amendment was the
deciding factor in Calder v. Bull'9 and in Citizens' Savings
and Loan Association v. Topeka.20 In both cases the Court
rejected the notion that the Constitution is the sole source
of human liberty and instead limited state intrusion on "fun-
damental liberty" as broadly defined to include the rights
asserted. If indeed the Ninth Amendment embodies the
principle that rights inhere in the people and do not spring
from the document, then it would follow that those rights
are enforceable against state as well as federal government.
Could the framers have intended the federal courts to en-
force and identify claims against the state governments?
After 150 years of disuse, Justice Douglas resurrected
the Ninth Amendment in his majority opinion to Griswold
v. Connecticut to buttress his finding of a "penumbra of
privacy" created by the Bill of Rights. 2' While Douglas saw
it more as an enabling amendment than a source of law
per se, the Ninth nonetheless formed a necessary part of
his skillful creation of a right to privacy. 22 In a concurring
opinion to the same case, Justice Goldberg relied explicit-
ly on the Ninth, seeing it as an affirmation of a vital prin-
ciple of liberty: we retain certain fundamental rights; among
them is the right to privacy in the marital relationship.23
Goldberg seems to rely on little else than his strong hunch
that marital privacy is a fundamental right. He takes some
care to draw his opinion narrowly so as not to risk flooding
the courts with claims to other unenumerated rights of a
fundamental character. But, other than suggesting we look
to American tradition, 24 he offers little guidance as to how
those rights might be found or discovered - a question
which has plagued all students of the Ninth Amendment,
before and after Griswold. Even more problematic than his
lack of guidance in future findings of right is Goldberg's ap-
plication of the amendment to the states. Although he ex-
plicitly denies that the Ninth Amendment can be funnelled
through the Fourteenth to limit state government, he
nonetheless applies the Ninth as a limitation on state
power. He writes fondly of an expanding notion of liberty
under the due process clause, one which would be protec-
tive of those liberties which are necessary to a free and just
society. The dissents to the Griswold case are reflective
of the conservative positions as outlined infra.
The penumbra of privacy invented in Griswold has
since been invoked in a variety of cases. The line of law
leading up to and following the 1973 abortion decision is
unquestionably the most well-known and controversial
of the penumbra's progeny." In no Supreme Court deci-
sion since Griswold has the Ninth Amendment been in-
voked by the majority to protect a right beside privacy, nor
has the amendment ever provided the sole basis for a deci-
sion by the Court.26 Aside from the line of privacy cases
coming directly out of the Roe v. Wade decision and in-
volving the extent to which states may regulate abortion, 2'
the Ninth Amendment has achieved little attention by the
Supreme Court since it first bared its teeth in the Griswold
case. In the landmark abortion decision of Roe v. Wade,
Justice Douglas reemphasized his belief that, "the Ninth
Amendment obviously does not create federally enforceable
rights." 8 In Griswold, Douglas saw the Ninth only as an
enabling amendment, never an independent source of
rights. 29 But in a dissenting opinion to another case,
Douglas suggested that "the right of the people to educa-
tion or to work or to recreation ... , like the right to pure
air and pure water, may well be rights 'retained by the peo-
ple! under the Ninth Amendment."
30
Some of the Justices see the amendment neither as
a source of liberty nor as an enabler. It is simply, like the
Tenth, a "meaningless truism."31 This has been the posture
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of the majority of the Court. Although the Court in Roe
v. Wade extended the zone of privacy to encompass a
woman's right to an abortion, this zone did not expand
sufficiently to create a right of funding for impoverished
women who could not otherwise afford to pay for an abor-
tion.3 2 Moreover, in the recent case of Bowers v. Hard-
wick,33 the Court refused to find that consensual adult
homosexuality fell within the penumbra of privacy, deciding
instead in favor of the states' right to regulate this area of
its citizens' conduct.
One scholar identified a 1963 decision by the Colorado
Supreme Court34 as containing the broadest pronounce-
ment on the meaning of the Ninth Amendment:
We have no hesitancy in stating that there are
fundamental and inherent rights with which all
humans are endowed even though no specific
mention is made of them in either the national
or state constitutions.
The constitutions of the state and nation
recognize unenumerated rights of natural en-
dowment. These God-given rights should be
protected from infringement or diminution by
any person as well as any department of the
government.
Natural rights - inherent rights and liberties -
are not the creatures of constitutional provi-
sions either at the national or state level. The
inherent human freedoms with which mankind
is endowed are "antecent to all early govern-
ments; rights that cannot be repealed or
restrained by human laws; rights derived from
the Great Legislator of the Universe."
35
More often, however, the amendment has been invoked
in the lower federal courts with varying degrees of failure.
Any successful case has used the amendment in the sense
in which it was employed in the Griswold case, to enable
a protection based on the "penumbra of privacy." These
cases include: protection of the right to wear long hair;
36
and the exclusion of otherwise admissable evidence at the
pre-trial hearing. 37 Distressingly, although all of the many
attempts to use the Ninth Amendment to protect protestors
and demonstrators have failed, in People v. Doorley,38 the
District of Rhode Island affirmatively applied a Griswold
rationale to suppress a demonstration. It was held that the
protestors in a residential neighborhood invaded the
residents' right to privacy.39 Ironically, while the Nebraska
courts declined to reach the Ninth Amendment privacy
claims of an unmarried female public schoolteacher after
being fired for "spending the night" with men,40 a Califor-
nia court has, on Ninth Amendment grounds, ordered the
reinstatement of a male postal worker fired for the
equivalent reason. 4' The amendment has also been used
successfully to challenge laws forbidding interstate
transport of obscene materials. 42
Often the courts have refused to reach a Ninth Amend-
ment claim, rather than deny it on the merits. In 1947, the
Supreme Court held that if Congress exercises a granted
power it has by definition not violated the Ninth or Tenth
Amendment.43 This principle has been used to deny many
Ninth Amendment claims against Congressional action.
From time to time the amendment has been unsuccessful-
ly invoked to cover a variety of creative affirmative protec-
tions including: the right to family life as a challenge to the
Social Security Act's income exclusion provision; 44 a
prisoner's right to be free from sexual attacks and
and assaults; 4 a military woman's right to bear children;
46
and, especially interesting, a right for people to have a de-
cent environment. In one such case, the plaintiffs wanted
to enjoin the construction of a dam. "They pointed to the
fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments as authority for
a right to 'enjoy the beauty of God's creation, and to live
in an environment that preserves the unquantified amenities
of life.' "4'
This last example is illustrative of the typical manner
in which the Ninth Amendment is invoked. For excellent
tactical reasons, it is rarely solely relied on but is sometimes
thrown into the constitutional stew for good measure. Prior
to Griswold, the legal actors in a case might have relied
exclusively on the due process clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to protect any right which they
characterized as "fundamental to liberty." Now, the legal
argument takes much the same form, its substance yielding
to include the principle of Ninth Amendment - begging
the question: what does the Ninth Amendment really have
to offer?
Unwritten Law
The first and most obvious stumbling block in Inter-
preting the Ninth Amendment is the very idea of unenu-
merated rights. If rights are not granted by the government,
but inhere in the people, where do these rights come from?
According to Gordon Wood, under English law "the con-
stitution" was made up by the total body of government
and ordinary law, "that assemblage of laws, customs and
institutions which form the general system; according to
which the several powers of the state are distributed, and
their respective rights are secured to the different members
of the community."48 It was unimaginable for Parliament
to act in violation of the Constitution because every act
of Parliament was by definition part of the Constitution.
Thus the rights of the people were simply whatever was
commonly believed and held by the courts and the
legislature. And, to this extent, those rights would be pro-
tected. If, however, a particular right failed to be protected,
that was not a sign of tyranny. Rather, it was an indica-
tion that the right did not exist. The terms "illegal" and "un-
constitutional" were synonymous. By the same token, these
"rights" were revokable at will by the Parliament.
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In the colonies, appeal began to be made to fundamen-
tal principles which transcended human-made law. By ap-
pealing to higher principles, Attorney General James Otis
argued against the general writs of assistance which the
Crown used to search colonists' homes at will. He believ-
ed that the whole purpose of law was the preservation of
"men's rights."4 9 There was a need to articulate the collec-
tive understanding of the people. "Something must exist
in a free state, which no part of it can be authorized to
alter or destroy, otherwise the idea of a constitution can-
not subsist.""0 Thus the notions of constitutionality and
legality were severed. There emerged two conceptions of
law, lex scripta and lex non scripta. Lex scripta was the
written statutory law passed by government and describ-
ed as "legal." Lex non scripta was the unwritten common
law eminating from principles and described as "constitu-
tional."-"
The call for a written constitition seemed oxymoronic
at first - how could unwritten law be written? This con-
tradiction was lessened by conceiving that the constitition,
as written, was a representation of the body of unwritten
law which is our "real" constitution. The United States Con-
stitution (hereinafter "The Constitution) is the recognition
not the source of the people's liberties. The unalterability
of The Constitution was to be its great strength; The Con-
stitution would act as a foundation for this great new
republic. This view of The Constitution may give rise to
conflicting interpretations of the Ninth Amendment. On the
one hand, it emerges as a powerful affirmation of the ex-
istence of the real unwritten constitution (hereinafter "the
CONSTITUTION"). As such, Ninth Amendment claims
should be seriously considered by the courts in order to
insure that The Constitution is truly a recognition of the
CONSTITUTION. On the other hand, the principle em-
bodied in the Ninth may be interpreted as an escape clause
to the contract of The Constitution. As long as The Con-
stitution works, and our judicial, legislative and executive
branches are fulfilling their compact with the sovereign peo-
ple, we must obey the law as developed by those bodies
- we will assume that The Constitution is in accordance
with the CONSTITUTION. But if a discrepancy develops
between the CONSTITUTION and The Constitution, we
must amend The Constitution. Ultimately, the Ninth
Amendment may represent the possibility of a gap between
the two constitutions, one which if not bridged must be
resolved in favor of the true CONSTITUTION. Seen this
way, the Ninth is an amendment of revolutionary poten-
tial - it states that the people are the highest law and may
destroy the republic as constituted if it does not comport
with their principles.
In many ways, The Constitution has come to be con-
strued more as the source than the recognition of our liber-
ties. This is evident in conservative jurists' standard reliance
on the text of the document to decide constitutional issues
- if ain't written down, you ain't got the right. By the same
token, the decisions made by judges are in most instances
informed by the body of current public conscience (as
developed by judges) on the subject. As the public called
for civil rights for blacks and other disenfranchised persons,
the courts responded.5 2 Perhaps the result if not form of
constitutional argument is precisely that envisioned by the
founders - continuously reinterpreting The Constitution
to make it in line with the CONSTITUTION.
But how do we determine the collective will? How do
we prevent "backlashes" in public opinion and separate fads
from "real" evolution in commonly held principle? What
guiding principles do we have to interpret and protect our
rights? It is not simply a matter of identifying rights, but
determining how they can best be protected and when they
have been violated. The search for a fixed point of
reference, some articulable standard when dealing with
rights, has plagued legal scholars throughout this century.
Justice Goldberg suggests we look to tradition, the collec-
tive conscience of the American people and the re-
quirements of a free society.53 Ronald Dworkin attempts
to solve this problem by using rights themselves as the fix-
ed reference point and deriving all rules for dealing with
rights from what the existence of rights per se implies.
Dworkin resurrects two familiar principles from which rights
are derived: (1) the Kantian notion of human dignity and
(2) political (not economic) equality.54 Dworkin sees the
government and the individual as necessarily opposed to
one another. Rights are limits on the government, enforc-
ed by the government for ultimate vindication of individual
liberty. This approach has been criticized for taking rights
too seriously, and, while internally consistent, not consider-
ing the exigencies of human society.5 5 But Dworkin main-
tains that both left and rightwing critics of "true" liberal
rights theory are similar in their emphasis on community
norms and values as the ultimate arbiters and protectors
of human liberty. This emphasis risks elevating commu-
nity concerns above those of the individual and does not
seriously consider what it means to have a system based
on rights.
Communal Rights
The radical left has often been critical of rights as
property-based cornerstones of liberal ideology, reinforc-
ing existing economic inequities in our capitalist system.
But most critical legal theorists are not disparaging of the
content of many individual rights.5 6 Most believe in the
freedom to speak, to dissent, to associate and assemble,
the freedom not to be subject to unreasonable searches
and seizures. We would not want it to be otherwise. Never-
theless, the left has balked at "rights" generally as tools of
liberal ideology, reinforcing and legitimating the status quo.
We observe the phenomenon of political debate being
reformed and shaped into legal debate, using rights
language. Until 1983 when Canada adopted the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms modeled on the American
Bill of Rights, the Canadian "constitution" was unwritten,
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like the British "constitution" discussed above. Some argue
that the adoption of the Charter has stripped Canadian
public discourse of its political character, focusing instead
on rights, and rights language.5 7 The perceived weakening
of the trade unions and the feminist struggle in Canada has
been of particular concern and highlights the dichotomy
that has developed between rights and politics. Elizabeth
Schneider writes on the dialectic of rights and politics in
this country, speaking of ways that rights discourse can
inform political discourse and vice versa. She gives
examples from the feminist movement in which court bat-
tles for women's reproductive freedom, and recognition of
sexual harrassment and woman-battering have used rights
language to crystallize and give a name to "unspeakable
truths" which in turn pushed the political movement, at the
important level of consciousness-changing, further.58
Staughton Lynd urges us not to fall into the very dichotomy
we criticize - we can redefine rights in a positive way which
reunites the legal and political instead of reinforcing their
artificial estrangement. Rights need not be based on pro-
perty. Nor need they be played in a "zero-sum" game -
where if one right is protected another must yield. Lynd
presents an expansive vision of rights where protection of
individual rights reinforces those of the community and con-
versely. Indeed, Lynd cautions against conceptualizing
rights as belonging to either the group or the individual.
The freedom of the community is secured by the freedom
of the individual - neither entity owns rights.59
The Ninth Amendment may embody a similar prin-
ciple: human rights are not finite in number nor are they
granted by the government. Human rights precede the con-
stituting of government and afterwards continue to inhere
in the people. As Lynd observes about the First Amend-
ment, the Ninth states that rights are retained by "the
people," rather than by individuals. 60 Bork, Kennedy and
other arch-conservative jurists read the Ninth Amendment
narrowly, ignoring and disparaging it and the other rights
it may stand for because they believe that the invocation
of rights is a zero-sum game. To them, it is impossible to
create or identify rights which inhere in the people without
diminishing rights already possessed by others and increas-
ing powers not delegated. Interestingly, at least one legal
scholar maintains that the Ninth Amendment was
Madison's affirmation that he did not see powers and rights
in opposition:
Madison was trying, in other words, to avoid
an antithesis. Not powers versus rights, but
powers and rights. And as the powers were not
to be literally construed, but were to be suffi-
cient for their purposes through the operation
of the necessary and proper clause, so the
rights were to be broader than those enumer-
ated through the operation of his tenth proposi-
tion [the Ninth Amendment].
61
But this is only true if rights are conceived of as property
and the individual and the group are set in opposition to
each other. Lynd calls for a new conception of rights, not
as possessed by either the individual or the community but
as embodied in the relations between the two as mutually
reinforcing.
Lynd's conception of community rights is in many
ways not dissimilar to that of the founders. At the time
of the formation of the republic, it was assumed that
citizens were commonly working for the public good,
Private rights and interests were subsumed to the whole
or community for the public welfare and safety of the
people. To the Whigs, minority or individual rights were
initially unintelligible because they implied that there was
a sickness in the body politic. By definition the majority,
as comprised of property-holding white male voters, could
not tyrannize. It could be licentious or anarchical but not
tyranical. 62 Similarly, Lynd perceives the conflict between
individual and community interests to be unintelligible to-
day. Unlike some founders of the republic, Lynd recognizes
that tyranny of the majority can and does exist. Within this
very real and often oppressive framework, Lynd calls for
a practical application of rights, one which does not con-
flict with community, but instead with property. Interesting-
ly, some of the Whigs of the time actually perceived the
inherent conflict between protecting individual property
rights and traditional republican theory. This conflict ap-
peared all the more intractible given the commonly held
belief that liberty depended upon protection of property.
6 3
One Whig observed that "there can be no true liberty
without security of property; and where property is secure,
industry begets wealth; and wealth is often productive of
a train of evils naturally destructive to virtue and freedom!
"6 4
Accordingly, the people searched for something which
would control amassing of wealth without inhibiting
freedom - that something was virtue. 6" Wood debunks
the idea that self-interest was commonly believed to pro-
mote public virtue. Private vicious behavior could only
diminish the public good. Thus, in some respect, the
negative aspects of the public-private distinction as observ-
ed by political and legal theorists today, 66 did not concep-
tually exist in 1787. The republic depended upon the
morality of its people - private virtue collected was public
virtue. Correspondingly, if there was damage to the public
good, it affected the individual - "public good is not a term
opposed to the good of individuals, on the contrary, it is
the good of every individual collected." 67 A central tenet
of Patterson's faith in the Ninth Amendment comes in Its
affirmance of human rights at every level. Perhaps the Ninth
Amendment may be used as a way around today's public-
private problems in which rights are only protected against
infringement by state action not private action. Currently,
discrimination against blacks is tolerated as long as it Is
not done under color of state law. If the Ninth Amendment
applies to state government, perhaps it applies to all of us.
None of us, jointly or severally, has the right to disturb or
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infringe upon rights which are essential to our free society.
In order to consider whether it may limit all of us, we must
examine the Ninth's application to state government.
Federalism
Because of the broad implication inherent in a protec-
tion of unarticulated liberties, the issue of federalism always
arises when discussing the Ninth Amendment. As Justice
Goldberg recognized, if the Ninth Amendment is to have
meaningful content then the Constitution must not be con-
sidered to be the sole "source" or grantor of rights. There
are other equally important rights retained by the people.
Implicitly, the people must be able to exercise these retained
rights. But, as Ronald Dworkin points out, this exercise
is meaningless if not enforced and protected by the govern-
ment (or community). It is not sufficient to assert that I have
a right to protest the United States intervention in Central
America - if I am arrested and imprisoned for my actions,
then the community has not recognized my right.68 Con-
servative interpreters of the Ninth Amendment cling to the
vulnerable position that unenumerated rights need not be
protected. A key and explicit motivating force behind this
interpretation is the realization that enforcement of these
as yet unarticulated liberties would most likely be ac-
complished through the federal, not state, courts. Moreover,
the right might often be enforced, as it was in the Goldberg
case, against state governments, not merely federal. Indeed,
Patterson devotes an entire chapter of his treatise to the
applicability of the Ninth Amendment to state govern-
ments. He sees the amendment as a general affirmation
of human liberty which, had it been interpreted as he sug-
gests, would have allowed the federal courts to strike down
noxious state law long before the advent of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Of course, this last supposition ignores the
initial strength of state power and the fact that the framers
explicitly rejected a constitutional amendment which would
have made the first eight amendments enforceable against
the states.69 Nonetheless, this component of Ninth Amend-
ment interpretation must be given serious consideration.
The expansion of federal power urged and accomplish-
ed by liberal strategists in this century seems to be ex-
plainable more by a focus on result rather than on any par-
ticular underlying principle. To wit, the federal courts ap-
peared to be the more liberal and enlightened, the place
where civil liberties would be most protected. Patterson
summarized the attitude of many advocates of civil liberty
when he said, "[w]e believe that in the one hundred and
sixty and more years of the history of our Federal Govern-
ment, the quality of statesmanship of Federal officers has
been on the whole of a higher character than those who
administer State govemments."7 0
For advocates of a more communitarian society,
reliance on the federal government may be both misplac-
ed and dangerous: misplaced because it potentially under-
mines the alleged goal of increased community and local
control of the political process; dangerous because the
desired result of this reliance may be entirely dependent
upon the political character of a particular Supreme Court,
Congress or Presidential Administration. Indeed, there is
evidence that state courts in recent years are in the
vanguard of human rights advancement, particularly in the
area of criminal law. In its last four terms, the Supreme
Court has, with the aid of cases like Michigan v. Long,
(where the Court, per J. O'Connor, granted federal jurisdic-
tion and control on appeal of any case in which the state
court was not explicitly relying exclusively on state law.
Even an mixed reliance on federal and state law or an im-
plicit invocation of federal law could trigger federal jurisdic-
tion)7 ' reversed 72% of all criminal cases where the state
courts upheld constitutional rights claims.7 ' Thus, gains
accomplished through a gradual erosion of state power may
be in the process of backfiring on those concerned with
advancement of human rights. Moreover, a focus on federal
protection of human rights with little regard to its diminu-
tion of state power may undermine local control of policy.
Often this dichotomy of accomplishing communitarian
goals through central control seems unavoidable. Lynd, a
proponent of communal rights, also advocates using those
mechanisms which are already in place as instruments to
effect change. In particular, he examines "the right to engage
in concerted activities for.., mutual aid or protection" as
identified by the National Labor Relations Act.7 3 This right,
put forth in legislation created by Congress and ultimately
enforceable by the federal courts, is at the heart of what
is called for in Lynd's conception of communal rights.
7 4
Likewise, Lynd and others advocate reliance on federal con-
stitutional rights. But he also cautions against the "political
schizophrenia" which has often been characteristic of the
left. In the 1930s, "radicals talked about democracy in
public and about socialism in private; the American peo-
ple concluded that radicals could not be trusted to mean
what they said."7 " Currently, radical lawyers use the
language of rights in court while their academic counter-
parts disparage it in the classroom. This creates a
dichotomy between the theory and practice of the left. Em-
phasis on federal control to achieve local communitarian
goals may present a similar dichotomy. If so, we must also
work to avoid that dichotomy and concentrate on true local
community change and affirmation of human liberty
whenever and wherever possible.
Conclusion
Every political and legal philosopher must have her
own version of public virtue in order for the system,
whatever it is, to work. Romantic appeals to a communal
vision of society ring hollow if they do not have a compo-
nent of public virtue. Even Dworkin, for all his scorn of
"community," appeals to principles of human dignity and
equality, presumably in furtherance of the public good, that
can only be achieved by individuals as a community. At
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present, virtue seems to be that missing ingredient in our
society; without which true equality cannot exist. Ironical-
ly, the founders saw virtue as a protection against unequal
accumulation of wealth; instead, it is the unequal accumula-
tion of wealth which has destroyed virtue. In fact, proper-
ty and virtue are ultimately incompatible. Virtue cannot act
as a pressure cap on a volatile property-based system. This
thinking is circular. As William Moore Smith observed,"6
security of property begets wealth and wealth can produce
evils which destroy virtue - thus we cannot depend upon
virtue to prevent its own destruction! Therefore, in order
to encourage virtue to flourish and produce a free society,
we must sever liberty from property and develop a new con-
ception of rights, as called for by Lynd. The due process
clause is simply inadequate to meet the needs of communal
rights advocates because it explicitly links liberty and pro-
perty and does not provide for a more communal-based
rights systems. It is here where the Ninth may be most
helpful. Let us use the Ninth Amendment and the principles
for which it stands to protect and further those rights which
we retain.
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